Credit Rationing in Small Scale Enterprises: Special Microenterprise Programs in Ecuador by Baydas, Mayada M. et al.
. ' 
" 
., ;"":· 
' 4i .• ~-
~·· ,·f I·"· 
.•• 'i 
'I.,• 
Economics and Sociology 
Occasional Paper No. 1924 
CREDIT RATIONING IN SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISES: 
SPECIAL MICROENTERPRISE PROGRAMS IN ECUADOR 
by 
Mayada M. Baydas 
Richard L. Meyer 
and 
Nelson Aguilera-Alfred 
Revised October 1992 
Paper presented at the 
1992 Annual Meetings of the 
American Agricultural Economics Association 
Baltimore, Maryland 
August 9-12, 1992 
Agricultural Finance Program 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
and 
Rural Sociology 
The Ohio State University 
2120 Fyffe Road 
Columbus, Ohio 43210-1099 
Abstract 
Small scale enterprises receive several forms of aid, but many are denied access to 
formal loans. A demand and supply model is estimated to analyze the factors lenders use 
to ration credit in special microenterprise programs. The results reveal that suppliers do 
not discriminate against less profitable enterprises and entrepreneurs who have not 
completed their high school education; however, these entrepreneurs have a smaller demand 
for external finance from the microenterprise programs than more profitable enterprises and 
entrepreneurs who have graduated from high school. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Small scale rural and urban enterprises have been the concern of many policymakers 
attempting to accelerate the development process in low income countries. These enterpris-
es often receive several types of aid in the form of targeted credit programs, training and 
technical assistance (Levitsky). Many entrepreneurs continue to face difficulties, however, 
in expanding their operations because of a reported lack of funds (Meyer, 1989). Many 
special microenterprise programs have been created for those entrepreneurs who have 
difficulty in getting access to regular commercial loans. External finance is obtained by 
some entrepreneurs through these special microenterprise programs, but some entrepreneurs 
also experience credit rationing in these programs. 
Lenders make their loan decisions within regulatory constraints, such as interest rate 
ceilings, and based upon some observed characteristics of borrowers and their businesses. 
Lenders typically face problems of asymmetric information when trying to identify the 
riskiness of lending to subsets of borrowers. Financial contracts involve default risk because 
of adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with the borrower's indetermi-
nate type and unpredictable action (Stiglitz and Weiss). Imperfect information generates 
an equilibrium in credit markets where interest rates are inadequate to clear the market 
demand for loans (Bester; Jaffee and Russell). To resolve asymmetric information 
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problems and to identify creditworthy borrowers, lenders utilize non-price rationing 
mechanisms based upon the characteristics of enterprises and entrepreneurs (Aguilera and 
Graham; Lapar and Graham). Credit rationing occurs when lenders grant the loans 
demanded by applicants who are identified as creditworthy borrowers while granting loans 
smaller than demanded to some applicants and completely rejecting other applicants willing 
to pay the interest rate demanded. 
This paper describes a model used to investigate credit rationing by lenders in special 
microenterprise programs in Ecuador. The objective was to evaluate the important factors 
used in credit rationing which result in some loan applicants being rejected and others 
receiving amounts smaller than demanded in these targeted programs. The next section 
introduces the theoretical model used for evaluating the credit rationing process. The third 
section describes the data used, and the results and implications are discussed in section 4. 
The last section presents the conclusions of the study. 
2. THE CREDIT RATIONING MODEL 
The framework needed for analyzing credit rationing requires consideration of the 
demand for and supply of loans. Aguilera and Graham, and Maddala and Trost, among 
others, argue that it is necessary to utilize a model including both demand and supply equa-
tions to determine conclusively whether credit allocation patterns represent supply side 
external rationing or internal self-selection by some types of borrowers. A simultaneous 
equations system should be estimated utilizing information about all applicants, both 
borrowers and non-borrowers, in order to avoid biased results. A single equation supply 
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model could result in the misleading interpretation that lenders discriminate against a 
particular type of borrower, while the simultaneous estimation of a demand equation could 
reveal that some classes of entrepreneurs demand less external finance. Thus, the model 
used in this paper involves a demand and supply simultaneous equations system which tests 
for the criteria used by lenders in the rationing process. 
It is assumed that special microenterprise programs provide entrepreneurs with loans 
at some exogenously established interest rate for each loan type. Intervention programs are 
often designed to target particular classes or types of borrowers who presumably have 
limited access to other sources of formal finance; thus, interest rates are usually predeter-
mined by borrower and loan type. Due to asymmetric information, lenders employ non-
price rationing mechanisms to determine the maximum loan amount they will grant each 
applicant, and reject some applications from entrepreneurs who seem to be too risky. The 
demand and supply equations can be presented as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
where LD is loan demand; LS is the maximum amount that the lender is willing to lend 
given the state of knowledge about the applicant; r is the fixed interest rate charged for a 
particular loan type; X is a vector of independent explanatory variables; and u1 and u2 are 
random disturbances assumed to be independent of X. 
Lenders select borrowers according to the following decision rule: 
LR= {LS l/LS:<!:W 
0 lfLS<W 
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(3) 
where LR is the observed loan granted. Decision rule (3) presents a censored dependent 
variable where applicants under the condition LS ~ LD fall in the creditworthy borrower 
subgroup, while applicants where LS < LD fall in the rejected applicant subgroup. A 
similar general model was advanced by Nelson, where different cases are discussed depend-
ing on the available information about the latent endogenous variables. It is assumed that 
the random disturbances follow a bivariate normal distribution with a zero mean vector and 
unknown variances and covariance, (a/, a/, a12), and that both disturbances are independent 
across observations and of X. The formulation of the likelihood function requires the 
derivation of the distribution of LR from the joint distribution of u1 and u2• 
Assuming u1 and u2 to be independent, the likelihood function (L) to be maximized 
as advanced by Nelson is: 
"o LD "a 11o+111 
L = II f /(LS-P'iX2)dLS ·II /(LR-P 12XJ· II /(W-P'1X1) (4) 
--
where l1o is the subset of rejected applicants and n1 is the subset that is granted loans. The 
data typically available is for LD and LR, i.e. LS is observed only when LS ~ LD. Nelson 
suggests that this case allows the separate estimation of equation (1) by OLS and equation 
(2) by Tobit analysis with no identification problems. For this study, however, we believe 
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that maximum likelihood will yield more efficient results for the simultaneous equations 
system, so this estimation technique is used given the information available (Maddala). 
The estimated loan demand equation is: 
LD = ao + a11R + aiIL + ¥ST + a4PRFf + asSTRT + 3t,OW + ~NAGR + agLOC 
+ ~DUC + a10SEX + a11AGE 
with the variables identified in Table 1. The loan supply equation is specified as: 
LS = b0 + b11R + b2MAT + b3AST + b4PRFf + b5STRT + b60W + b7NAGR + b8LOC 
+ b.PDUC + b10SEX + b11AGE 
The demand and supply equations include interest rates (IR) to measure price elasti-
cities, and several proxies to describe the characteristics of enterprises and entrepreneurs 
believed to be used by lenders to ration credit {Aguilera and Graham; Lapar and Graham; 
Liedholm and Mead). The demand equation includes informal loans (IL) to measure the 
degree of complementarity or substitutability between formal and informal sources of loans; 
size of business, measured by value of total assets {AST), to measure the need for liquidity; 
profits (PRFf) reported for 1989 to indicate ability for self-finance; agricultural vs. non-
agricultural enterprises {NAGR) in the production, commerce, and service sectors to reflect 
the demand for loans in different sectors; years of experience of the entrepreneur (STRT) 
to reflect management capabilities; and ownership (OW) versus non-ownership and other 
personal characteristics to represent type of applicant. The supply equation includes 
maturity of loans (MAT) in months to test the preference of lenders for maturity periods; 
amount of assets in the business {AST) to reflect the entrepreneur's ability to provide loan 
collateral or to liquidate in order to meet loan payments; amount of profits (PRFf) 
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representing potential income for loan repayment; agricultural or non-agricultural (NAGR) 
enterprises as a possible reflection of risk; past experience of the entrepreneur as reflected 
in the years of operating the business (STRT); ownership (OW) versus non-ownership of 
businesses and personal characteristics of the entrepreneur including education (EDUC), 
sex (SEX) and age (AGE) as additional possible indicators of entrepreneurial success and 
creditwo~hiness. Geographic location (LOC) is included to determine if demand and supply 
conditions differ in the dynamic coastal region versus other regions of the country. 
3. THE MICROENTERPRISE SURVEY 
The data used in this study were obtained from a survey of small scale enterprises 
conducted in Ecuador in 1990. It involved in-depth interviews with 625 entrepreneurs ran-
domly selected from non-participants and participants in special microenterprise programs, 
that either directly grant loans or assist borrowers to get commercial loans. A total of 248 
entrepreneurs applied for loans from the special microenterprise programs during the year, 
of which 172 received loans, while the rest did not get access to any loan amounts and were 
completely rejected. Loans were extended in amounts ranging from 60,000 to 8,500,000 
sucres1, with nominal interest rates ranging between 36% and 56% for loans given for per-
iods of 1 to 2 years. Loan demands were reported from a minimum of 100,000 to a 
maximum of 15,000,000 sucres. The informal loans received varied between 10,000 and 
2,000,000 sucres. The borrowers were approximately equally distributed between the coastal 
and other regions, with 80% owning their enterprises and about 40% representing female 
1 Approximately 900 sucres = 1$. 
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entrepreneurs. The majority of the entrepreneurs ( 40%) were concentrated in production 
activities, 25% in commerce, 24% in services, and only 2.5% in agriculture. 
4. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The results presented in Table 2 were generated from the maximum likelihood 
estimation of the demand and supply simultaneous equations system. The results show 
acceptable R-squares for both equations considering models using cross-sectional data, and 
the F-values were significant. The demand equation produced an unexpected positive but 
insignificant interest rate (IR) coefficient. Interest rates have been negative in real terms 
in the past few years and at best bear a zero real rate at present. Under these circumstanc-
es, nominal interest rates may not effectively ration demand. 
The results show that borrowers with larger amounts of informal loans (IL) de-
mantled larger loans from microenterprise credit programs. Although this relationship is 
not significant, it may suggest that borrowers with large loan demand for microenterprise 
programs borrow from both formal and informal lenders. This result is analogous to the 
analysis provided by Meyer et al. (1990) which suggests that informal loans for some borrow-
ers are inferior to formal ones indicating substitution, while a number of entrepreneurs 
satisfy the terms and conditions for both sources and thus borrow simultaneously from both. 
The coefficients for both assets (AST) and profits (PRFT) are positively and signifi-
cantly related to loan demand. Assets as a proxy for size of business imply a higher loan 
demand among larger enterprises. Profits may be a proxy for business success and 
repayment capacity so that profitable businesses encourage entrepreneurs to incur greater 
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financial risk through increased borrowing. This explanation seems to overwhelm the 
alternative explanation that profits are a proxy for capacity to self-finance. 
Several variables may influence the risk perception of the entrepreneur and loan 
demand. These include the number of years the entrepreneur has been running the business 
(STRT) reflecting the entrepreneur's experience, the type of ownership of the business 
(OW), and the sector (NAGR) which separates agricultural from non-agricultural enter-
prises. There is no statistical significance between loan demand and age of business. 
Owners of businesses demand significantly larger loans than non-owners, and entrepreneurs 
operating non-agricultural businesses also demand significantly larger loans than those in 
agriculture. Entrepreneurs in the coastal region (LOC), including Guayaquil, demand signi-
ficantly smaller loan amounts than those in other regions including the capital of Quito. 
Highly educated entrepreneurs who hold high school diplomas and above seem to demand 
larger loans, and male entrepreneurs demand larger loans than female entrepreneurs. The 
negative but insignificant coefficient for age suggests that loan demand may decline for older 
entrepreneurs. 
As expected for the supply equation, the interest rate variable (IR) is positive and 
significant indicating that lenders are willing to supply larger loans at higher interest rates, 
perhaps because of the large transaction costs associated with small loans. Surprisingly, 
lenders are also more inclined to favor the disbursement of longer maturity loans; this may 
also reflect an attempt to lower transaction costs. Another surprise was that assets are not 
a significant variable. This may be due to the fact that many microenterprise loans are 
made with cosigner guarantees rather than taking physical assets as collateral. Profits, 
• • 
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however, are a significant variable, implying that lenders tend to make loan decisions based 
more on profits than on assets. This interesting result is what microenterprise advocates 
hope will occur in intervention projects such as special microenterprise programs. 
Almost all of the other variables included in the model to reflect the lender's 
perception of creditworthiness are not significant, except for education. This may be due 
to the fact that special microenterprise programs are developed precisely to channel funds 
to entrepreneurs who are excluded from regular commercial lending. Lenders evaluate the 
entrepreneur's education as a positive factor in determining loan size and this gives holders 
of high school degrees and above greater access to credit from these special programs. An 
important contrast stands out in Table 2, between the demand and supply effects of owner-
ship, sector, location, and sex. The results suggest that owners, non-agricultural entrepre-
neurs, and male entrepreneurs are more likely to get loans not because they are favored by 
lenders, but rather because they tend to demand larger loans. The smaller amount of loans 
reported by older entrepreneurs and those in the coastal region is not due to greater 
rationing, but rather because they demand less than young entrepreneurs and those from 
other regions. Finally, although it is believed that lenders often discriminate against female 
entrepreneurs, the variable for gender, (SEX), in the supply equation is positive but 
insignificant implying that neither gender has an advantage in receiving loans. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The credit rationing model specified in this paper highlights the importance of separ-
ating loan demand from loan supply effects when evaluating the criteria used by lenders in 
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rationing credit. The results show that if we would have considered a single supply equation 
model we could have misinterpreted the effects of profitability and education to imply that 
lenders discriminate against less profitable enterprises and entrepreneurs who have not 
completed their high school education. However, considering the demand effects, it is clear 
that entrepreneurs with less profitable enterprises and less education have a smaller demand 
for external finance from microenterprise programs than those with more profitable enter-
prises and who have graduated from high school. Likewise, enterprises in the agricultural 
sector, located in the coastal region, operated by non-owners, and managed by less experi-
enced entrepreneurs also receive smaller loans because they demand less, not because they 
have been more discriminated against than other entrepreneurs or enterprises. Finally, 
because the gender variable in the supply equation is not significant, it seems that 
discrimination against female entrepreneurs does not exist in the supply of loans, contrary 
to popular beliefs. However, the positive sign of the gender variable in the demand 
equation implies that male borrowers demand larger loans than female ones. 
To sum up our conclusions, the demand function suggests that larger assets and 
profits, and higher levels of education are associated with larger loan demand. Male entre-
preneurs, owners of enterprises and entrepreneurs in non-agricultural sectors also demand 
larger loans. As expected, the supply function implies that lenders grant larger loans at 
higher interest rates. Surprisingly, they grant larger loans for longer terms. Larger loan 
supplies are also associated with more profitable enterprises and entrepreneurs with higher 
education. 
. ' 
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These results are important because they show that if small scale enterprises are 
profitable and are operated by educated entrepreneurs who demand external finance, and 
if these entrepreneurs are willing to pay higher interest rates, their chances of getting loans 
may improve because of special microenterprise programs. On the other hand, like 
commercial lenders these programs also face information problems which lead them to 
ration borrowers by characteristics of entrepreneurs and enterprises. H entrepreneurs hope 
to be successful in borrowing, they need to participate actively in financial markets and 
generate information that lenders find useful in making loan decisions. This is likely to be 
most difficult for those small, first-time borrowers who also have the most difficulty in 
getting commercial loans. Special programs, therefore, may ease the credit constraints for 
some borrowers but they do not resolve the rationing problem inherent in credit markets. 
VARIABLE 
LO 
LS 
IR 
MAT 
IL 
AST 
PRFI' 
STRT 
ow 
NAGR 
LOC 
EDUC 
SEX 
AGE 
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TABLE 1 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
DESCRIPTION 
Amount of Credit Demanded a 
Amount of Loan Granted a 
Nominal Interest Rate in Percent 
Loan Period in Months 
Informal Loan Amount Received a 
Value of Assets Reported. a 
Amount of Profits for 1989 a 
Number of Years in Business 
Ownership Dummy Variable; l=Owner 
Sector Dummy Variable; !=Non-Agriculture 
Location Dummy Variable; !=Coastal Region 
Education Dummy Variable; 1 =High School Level or Above 
Gender Dummy Variable; 1 =Male 
Number of Years of Entrepreneur's Age 
a All values are in sucres. 
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TABLE 2 
RESULTS OF THE LOAN-QUANTITY RATIONING MODEL 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Coefficients 
Demand Supply 
Variable Coefficient 
IR 6,080.69 
MAT 
IL 0.01 
AST 0.14 
PRFf 2.23 
STRT -25,353.38 
OW 509,177.95 
NAGR 984,044.50 
LOC -782,009.75 
EDUC 415,348.57 
SEX 502,843.08 
AGE -11,061.86 
CONST 295,201.56 
R2 0.22 
F-Value 6.03*** 
N = 248 Observations 
* * * Significant at 1 percent level 
* * Significant at 5 percent level 
* Significant at 10 percent level 
T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio 
0.93 8,009.50 3.18*** 
11,435.38 2.43** 
0.07 
4.25*** 0.01 -0.34 
2.04** 0.75 2.19** 
-0.73 9,051.96 0.82 
1.56* 28,746.95 0.28 
2.13** 33,367.17 0.23 
-2.99** -41,751.62 -0.50 
1.51 * 168,641.96 1.96** 
1.86* 45,161.66 0.53 
-0.86 -3,083.99 -0.72 
0.41 -77,892.88 -0.34 
0.19 
5.28*** 
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